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IN Tl!E S'.JPRE:·!E COUF.T OF THE STATE OF UTAH

H~RRY

J. CHPISTIANSEN,
PlaintiffAppella:-it,

l-"T;>.H

and

TP~;.'JSI'I

JOH~l

G.

.~J.iTHO:OITY

BRIEF OF P.ESPmlDENTS

Case No. 17250

MILLE?.,

Defendants?.espondents.

NATURE OF THE

c.~_sE

This is an action filed by the plaintiff against
defenda:1ts Ctah Transit Authority and John G. Miller for
alleged

da~ages

Plai~tiff

arising frcrn a minor accident between

and a UTA bus.
DISPOSITION IN LOhER COURT

A jury trial was held with the Honorable G. Hal Taylor
presidi:1g.

The jury returned a special verdict finding

the plaintiff 70% negligent, the defendants 30% negligent,
and awar::ed special damages of $7, 700 and general damage
of $5,000.

The Court subsequently entered judgment in

Ce'.'enda:1ts'

favor of no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendants-respondents seek affirmance of the jury
·;erdict and t'1e lower court judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Respondents believe that the "Statement of
the Facts" contained in Appellant's brief is both inaccur~
in some respects and fails to include pertinent facts
relied upon by the jury, Respondents offer their own
statement.

It should be noted, [wwe·:er,

fact~

t:-:at any referer.c:

to the damage testimony and evidence during trial will be
reserved for review in the Argument portion of this brie:
~~

that Plaintiff has failed to raise any substantial

issue of damages requiring factual review.
The lawsuit in this matter involved an accident which
occurred between a bus owned and operated t:/ the l7ta!1
Transit Authority and driven by John G. Miller and a

Must~

automobile owned and operated by the plainti±:f Harr:/ J.
Christiansen.

While it is undisputed that an accident die

occur at 7th East and 21st South on Januar:/ 17, 1978, the
two versions of the accident are considerably different
and it cannot, therefore, be said that the facts are

"uncontroverted" as stated in Plaintiff's brief.

(Appellar:

brief, p. 2).
Plaintiff testified that on Januar:/ 17, 1978, he had
gone to a doctor's office to give him a bid on installing
plumbing.

After completion of this work t!1e plaintiff

proceeded south in his automobile on 7th east.

(Tr.

253-25:

It was about 6:00 o'clock p.m. when the plaintiff left the
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doctor's office.
plaintiff

s~a~ed

There was a light rain falling.

The

that at that time it was dark but the

visibility was good.

(Tr. 354).

The plaintiff characterized the traffic as fairly
heavy on 7th East and estimated that he was traveling between
35 and 40 miles an hour as he left the intersection of 17th
South and 7th East.

He stated that he first observed the

UTA bus shortly after leaving that intersection.

(Tr. 354-

3 5 5) •

The plaintiff stated that he continued down the road
and turned into the right-hand lane in preparation of a
right turn down 21st South.
behind another
(Tr. 355).

U~A

He stated that he stopped

bus which was near the intersection.

He estimated that he had turned into the right-

hand lane approximately one-half or one block before the
intersection and that he stopped about 10 feet behind the
bus.

He stated he did this because he did not like the

smell of emissions from buses.

(Tr. 355).

The plaintiff recalled that as he was stopped he
looked in his rear-view mirror to see where the bus was
that he had passed and noticed that it was coming but quite
a distance back.

He believed that the bus was about one-

half block back when he first looked in his mirror.
356).

(Tr.

The plaintiff claimed that he had been stopped in

the right lane for more than a minute before the accident

-3-
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occurred.

(Tr. 387).

The plaintiff testitied that as he was looking at
the parked bus in front of him he felt a surge and heard
a bang.

He stated that he felt himself going forward and

could see the dash or the visor of the window as it kicked
his head forward, thereby kinking it.

He testified that

after this impact he could not remember too

~uch

more.

(Tr. 365).
He recalled, however, that he felt dazed

a~d

the bus driver coming to his window and asking
wanted a police officer to investigate.

reme~~er;

~im

if

According to

Plaintiff, the bus driver commented he would probably lose
his job and then asked him again if he wanted to contact
the police.

The plaintiff replied he did and the bus

driver said he would make the call.

(Tr. 357).

Shortly thereafter a UTA supervisor arrived and told
the plaintiff that it would be quite some time before the
police would come and requested that the dri·.rers exchange
information rather than waiting for the police.

(Tr. 358).

The plaintiff admitted that he did not tell the drive~
or the supervisor that he was injured and stated that he
was too dazed and wobbly to make such a suggestion.

(Tr.

389).
Plaintiff stated that when he arrived home he felt
dazed and that his mother gave him some aspirin and told

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tri

;, l:r1

tc

s~c

fore

l i

2

~cw

down.

(Tr. 359).

much damage had

caref~lly

exa~ined

He stated that he was anxious

~c~n

done to his car and there-

it at home.

He decided to go to the UTA offices and report additional damage.

He, his mother, and father, drove to the

GTA main offices and talked to the same supervisor who was
at the scene of the accident concerning additional damage
to the car.
this

lat~r

(Tr.

360).

Plaintiff again admitted that during

conversation he did not say anything to the super-

visor concerning his physical condition since he was still
dazed and was not

ttin~i~g

clearl.

Since the defendant John Grant

'Tr. 397).
~iller

was not present

at the tria: his deposition was read and introduced into
p~::

evicence by t::ie

·:'.tiff.

~:r.

Miller stated that on

January 17, 1978, he was driving the Cottonwood Heights
route which included a southbound run on 7th East.

He

stated that the traffic was moderate to heavy and that it
was raining a little but the streets were not wet.

(Depo-

sition of John Grant Miller, taken January 8, 1980 and
ren·cunbered as part of this record as pages 289-290).
Defendant Miller recalled that he was driving in the
ri ·ht-hand lane of 7th East and had just stopped to let
out a passenger.
and 7tl-. Eas-:..

(R.

This stop was located around 1950 South
299).

There was no other bus stop

hetween that cne and the one located near the corner of

-5-
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21st South and 7th East.

( R. 299) .

Miller related that he pulled the bus back into the
right lane and reached a speed of about 30 to 35 miles
an hour which required about four or five seconds of
travel time.

298-299).

(R.

Miller observed that the 21st

South light was red and that another bus was sitting adjac:
to the bus stop near the

in~ersection.

(R.

2 92 ) •

.C..s he

came nearer to the intersection -ie began to slo·,.; down in
preparation of stopping.
~ustang

At this point the plaintiff's
=~s~~

la~e

(?. 293).

at a speed of about 30 to 35
Miller recalled that the

pulled into

~iles

~ustang

an hour.

was some 25 ts

30 feet in front of the bus when it pulled in front of
bus.

(R. 308).

t~

t~e

He stated that he put his brakes on as

soon as Plaintiff came into the lane in order to increase
the distance between the bus and the Mustang and that he
was attempting to slow down.

(R.

309) .

During the two or

three seconds that both vehicles were moving together the
defendant Miller stated he did not apply the brakes very
hard because this would have thrown the passengers down
the aisle.

(R. 310).

He stated he was attempting co

increase the distance between the car and the bus since
it was the company's policy to always i'\a~ntain approximate~.
three seconds of distance between a bus ar.d a 'lehicle in
front.

(Tr. 287).

However, ~iller stated he did not
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believe the distance between the vehicles increased
appreciably during this two or three second period.
(R.

312).

After the two or three seconds had elapsed the
Mustang's brake lights suddenly came on and the Mustang
nade what Miller characterized as a quick stop.

(R. 293).

The Mustang stopped approximately 50 feet behind the other
bus that was located at the bus stop.

(R.

300-301).

Miller stated that the Mustang could not have been stopped
for longer than one or two seconds before he bumped it.
(R.

292) .

At the time he saw the brake lights go on Miller
stated that he immediately attempted to panic-stop the
bi..;s.

(R.

313).

He recalled that the buses were equipped

with computerized air brake systems which stopped the wheels
from sliding even if a panic stop was being applied.

(R. 288).

Miller estimated that he hit the Mustang at between
fi',-e and ten miles an hour.

The Mustang rolled forward

about 40 feet upon being hit since its brakes were not
on but it did not hit the bus in front since there was over
SO feet of space in between the two vehicles.

(R. 295).

A diagram prepared by Miller during his deposition
was introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 and was received
as evidence.

In addition, a report, used at the deposition

alsc, which was filled out by Miller after the accident

-7-
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Defendants called Douglas

~oodbury

who is a fleet

engineer for the UTA and who had conducted tests of

UTA

buses as to the effect that out-of-adjustment slack
adjusters would have upon the stopping abilit:,· of the bus.
Woodbury stated that until al 1 four slac:-c adjusters were
out one and one-half turns the bus ·..;as still in conplianc;
with state stopping standards.

(Tr. 698).

The 12 click

adjustment referred to in the nechanic's report indicate:
that the nuts were backed up only three-quarters of a tu::
Had all four wheels been backed off this anount
brakes

5~j __

~~ulj

~ave

t~e

met state guidelines and if only

of the fou::- ·,,,::eels had been off this amount any de:icienc:
would ::-.ave been further reduced to only 25 percent.
706).

(Tr.

Stating it another way, Woodbury explained that

i~

one wheel were completely off as to its slack adjuster ar.:
the other three wheels were functioning properly the state
standard of stopping would still be met.

(Tr. 699).

This occurred because each wheel produces 25 percent o:
the braking force.

(Tr. 449).

As noted earlier, a number o: witnesses testified
on behalf of Plaintiff as to the alleged injury and damage'
incurred as a result of this accident.

Li:-cewise, Defendar.:

called several medical witnesses to refute these charges.
At the conclusion of the evidence the matter was submitte~
to the jury by way of special interrogatories.

-10-
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The jurj answered the S?ecial verdict form by finding
that ?laintiff Harry J. Christiansen was negligent, that
his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident,
that defendants UTA and John Miller were also negligent,
that their negligence was also a proximate cause of the
accident, and then alloted 70% of the negligence to plaintiff
Christiansen and 30% to defendants UTA and Miller.

In

addition, the jury found special dar.iages of medical expense
and lost

wage~

of $7,700 and general damages of pain and

suffering of $5,000.

(R.

176-177).

Subsequently, a judgment on the verdict was entered
finding no cause of action in favor of the defendants.
(?. 187-189).

Plaintiff then made a motion for judgment not-

withstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new
trial.

(R. 190-191.

At the time of hearing Plaintiff's

attorney was not present but the court denied the motions
based upon the merits and not upon the failure of Plaintiff's
counsel to appear.

(R.

192-194).

This appeal is taken from the judgment on the verdict entered
~ay

12, 1980, and from the order denying Plaintiff's motion for

a new trial and judgment entered July 8, 1980.

(R.

195).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 8 AND PROPERLY GAVE
INSTRCCTIONS NUMBERED 21, 22, 23, AND 24.
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Appellant devotes considerable arc;ument to his co:-:tention that the lower court improperly instructed t!le
jury.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-16).

An examination cf

the arguments, however, shows that such contention is
Appellant seems to base his objections upo~

without merit.

speculation, inferences, and assum;:::,tions ·.vhicr. are not
supported by the record and which,
rise to reversible error.

in any case, do :-iot

gL·~

An examination of each of Plain-

tiff's assertions will now be made.
~~e

Court Properly Refused to Give Plaintiff's

Requested Instruction No. 8.
Instruction No. 8 is a JIFU instruction intended for
use in those cases where a party has the obligatio:-i of
calling a witness or offering evidence to support his
position but fails to do so and relies upon weaker evidence
for support.

The instruction in this case, however, was

inappropriate at least as to Defendants.
Plaintiff complains that defendants should have callee
three witnesses:

John Miller; the signout supervisor; and

the mechanic who inspected the brakes following t!le

accidE~:

Under Plaintiff's argument, Defendants had an o:Oligation :c
call these people in order to bolster their defense as to
Plaintiff's claim of faulty brakes.
Plaintiff has misconstrued the context of t!lis trial.
It was the burden of Plaintiff, not Defendants,

to produce
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strongec e~idence in support of his claim of faulty brakes.
':''."le 1:>:csti:1ony cf John Miller in courl would not have
assisted Defendants in any way since Miller already stated
that in his opinion the brakes were not working as well as
the--/ should be.
wa; cf

In addition, when a witness testifies by

de~osition

it cannot be said that the in-court

testimony of the witness is of a stronger nature than his
deposition testinony.

Goggins v. Winkley, 495 P.2d 594

\clont. 1972).
1he evidence showed that the sign-out mechanic thought
that the brakes were operating properly and released the
bus tc Mr.

~iller.

(R.

315-317).

If Plaintiff wished to

dispute this fact it was his obligation to subpoena the
signout mechanic and examine him as tc what he based his
O!='inion upon that the brakes were ?roperly working.

It was

Flaintiff's obligation to call the signout mechanic as
his 0'.·1n •,;i tness if he wished to contradict the state of
the evidence.

Holland v. Kerr, 253 P.2d 88 (Cal. App. 1953).

Likewise, the evidence showed that Chuck Wooley, the
mechanic who worked on the bus following the accident,
prepared dn~ submitted a report as to the condition of the
slack adjusters.

He noted that the left adjuster was out

12 and that the right one had been replaced.

Defendant

called Douglas woodb11ry, a fleet engineer of UTA, and
Charl2s Oliver, a lead foreman of UTA, as witnesses who
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both explained what the "out of 12" nota.tion v.eant and
why a slack adjuster is replaced.
Since it was Plaintiff's burden to show

n2gli~ence

on the part of Defendants it was Plaintiff, not Defendant,
who should have called Mr. Wooley to explain ?.ny differencthe "out of 12" notation meant from th?.t testified to by
the UTA supervisors and to explai~ ex?.ctly why the right
For example,

slack adjuster was replaced.
~~r:·

since Mr. \\·ocd-

stated that slack adjusters are replaced either

~he~

the mechanism can no longer be adjusted or when it is
properly functioning,

nc~

it was Plaintiff's obligation to

prove that the replacement occurred because of a

defecti~

slack adjuster and not merely because it was no longer

=~

tional.
In addition, this type o:!" i:-cstruction is ;;ierely
abstract and the giving or failure to give it is not prejudicial error.

Bohle v. Matson

~avigation

Co., 412 P.2d

3 6 7 (Ore . 19 6 6) •

B.

The Trial Court Prope.::-1:: Gave Instruction :lo. 21.

Appellant quotes and complains only about the last
paragraph of Instruction No.

21.

There are five other

paragraphs preceding the one quoted by Plaintiff in his
brief.

(R. 158).

The instruction correctly stated the

rules applicable to both drivers as to using reasonable
care, lookout, speed, and

dist~nce.

It is :!"undamental
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that the j'_irv instructions when being examined on appeal
mu~t

be ~iewed as a whole and not in isolated segments.

Black v. McKnight,
~he

562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977).

last paragraph of Instruction 21 was patterned

after Section 41-6-69 U.C.A. which prohibits a person
from suddenly stopping or decreasing speeds without first
giving an appropriate signal.

It was Defendant's contention

that while an intersection was indeed being approached by
both the bus and the automobile driven by Plaintiff, that
Plainti:: cut in front of the

U~A

bus and abruptly

stopped without warning some 50 feet in back of another
bus and approximately 150 feet from the intersection.
Plaintiff seems to argue in his brief (Appellant's
brief ?· 9)

that where an intersection is in sight a pre-

ceding automobile may suddenly stop unexpectedly since both
drivers are aware that they will eventually have to stop
at the intersection.

Obviously, a driver approaching a

red light is under an obligation to either slow and gradually
stop at the light or to signal and warn a following driver
that he intends on stopping before the light.
In the instant case, for example, the plaintiff's
stnted desi~2 to avoid emissions from the bus in front of
him (R.

355) may have caused him to stop in back of the bus

at a ffiuch greater distance than any other driver would have
d0ne and made such stop totally unanticipated and abrupt.
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Since defendant Miller stated that the bus w~s some 50
feet ahead of the place in which the Mustang stop~ed,
it was a question for the jury to determine whether
Plaintiff's stop was sudden and whether a signal should
have been given to the bus.
287 (Wash. 1964).

~ames

v. Niebuhr, 380 P.2d

The evidencE viewed fron Defendants'

position justified such an instruction.

Case v. Olwell,

P.2d 664 ('iJash. App. 1970).
As to Plaintiff's claim that the braking lights thenselves were adequate signals it should be observed that
the question of whether a particular signal is appropriate
is a question for the jury to decide under the circumstanc,
of the case.

Apkins v. Bayer, 464 P.2d 233

(i<an. 1970).

This Court and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals have
both interpreted the requirement of signaling before sudde:
stops or decrease in speed as requiring more than the
simultaneous application of the brakes and the brake lighl
As stated by the 10th Circuit:
A fair inference to be drawn from the
testimony of Maddis and his wife is that
the brake light signal which was given by the
Vernon automobile was simul ta!le0us ·..;i t'l its
sudden decrease in speed.
ender such circumstances, the signal was not effective and was
not in compliance with the statute w'lich
provides that an appropriate ~~~nal ~ust be
given prior to stopping or sudJ~nlv decreasing
the speed of a vehicle.
Cnited St~tes v. First
Security Bank cf Utah, 20B~424, 429 (10th
Cir. 1953).
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(utah 1966).

For these reasons, the last paragraph of

Instruction 21 was properly given by the trial court.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Gave Instruction No. 22.

A review of Instruction No.

22 shows that it is a

correct statement of the law concerning the obligation of
a driver to ~aintain a reasonable lookout.

There is no

doubt that a driver has a duty to maintain a lookout
to the rear as well as in all directions.
575 P.2cl 2.040

IUtai1 1978).

Batty v. Mitchell,

It is a jury question as to

whether a driver maintained his duty of lookout to the
rear and whether such failure was a proximate cause of
the accident.

Hayden v. Cederlund, 263 P.2d 797

(Utah 1953).

Plaintiff asserts in his brief that "the collision
in question was caused bv the faulty brakes of the bus
and by the fact that the bus driver did not keep a proper
lookout and perhaps followed too close."
brief,

~-

10).

(Appellant's

This statement is correct in light of

Plaintiff's theory of the case but is totally incorrect as
to Defendants' theory.

Defendants maintained that the

collision was caused because Plaintiff cut in front of
the uTA bus and abruptly stopped for no apparent reason
when the bus was only some 30 feet in back of the car.
Defendants

~aintained

that the brakes were operating properly

and that the bus driver acted in a reasonable manner in light
of the fact that Plaintiff had placed himself in that position
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and had himself chosen to step some 50 feet in back of the
preceding bus.
Defendants were entitled to an instruction support1~c
their theory of the case.
621 (Utah 1977).

B 1 a ck v .

Mc Kn i 'ib_!,

5 6 2 P . 2d

If Instruction 22 auplicatcd Instructior.

21 such duplication is not reversible error.
Johnson, 436 P.2d 442

(Utah 1968).

warehouse Co., 398 P.2d 24

Viood~1.ouse

..

Jchnson v. Cornwall

(Utah :_965).

Thus, Instruction 21 was properly given.
D.

The Trial Court Properly Gave Instruction

p_~1~t1ff

~o.

23.

asserts that paragraph 3 of Instruction 23

is an incorrect statement of the law.

As

note~

ea~~ier,

however, the sirnul taneous pl 3.Ce:'.',en t of t:-,e b:::-akes ar.c t'.:e
bra~ing

lights has been deemed by this Court and the

10th Circuit Court of Appeals net to compl:; '.·:ith the

stat~:

In fact, paragraph 3 of Instruction 23 is exactly the
same instruction which was approved by this Court i!'l
Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines,

418 P.2d 779

(Ctah 1966).

See also United States v. First Security Bank of Utah, 208
F.2d 424

(10th Cir. l953).

Again, Plaintiff contends that since the -.-ehicles
were approaching an intersection the bus driver should

ha~

anticipated the stop of Plaintiff regardless of any signa:
given.

This argument is based on the assumption that the

Plaintiff stopped in an appropr~ate manner ~nd in an
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appro9riate ~lace at the intersection.
however,

The evidence showed,

th~t the point of accident was some 150 feet from

the in~ersect1on and that the plaintiff stopped, according
to Defendants' version of the evidence, approximately 50
feet in back of the preceding UTA bus.
Under these circumstances the jury was entitled to
deter~i~e whether the Plaintiff suddenly stopped or suddenly

decreased his speed in such a manner that a signal should
have been given.
Furthermore, any repetition as to Instructions 21
and 22 is again, as ?reviously noted, harmless error since
in each instruction a different principle concept was
being explained to the jury.
E.

The Trial Court Properly Gave Plaintiff's

Instruction No. 24.
Plaintiff complains that the lower court improperly
gave Instruction No. 24 which states that a person who is
without negligence on his part and is suddenly and unexpectedly
confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence
or the

apP2diance of imminent danger to himself or to others

is not expected nor required to use the same judgment and
prudence that mav be required of him in calmer and more
deliberate moments.

(R. 161).

Plaintiff contends that

even in the light most favorable to the defendants "it is
uncontroverted that the bus driver followed the Christiansen
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vehicle for some period of time prior to the time that
(.C..ppel lant' s

the Christiansen vehicle car,0 to its slop."
brief p. 12).

Plaintiff's assertion is completely erroneous.
Defendant John Miller testified that upon leaving the bus
stop at 1950 South 7th East he proceeded south on 7th Eas:

t?-.

at around 30 miles an hour.

29Sl.

t~.E

2e stated t:-iat

Mustang pulled into his lane so it was positioned about
\!'_.

25 to 30 feet in front of the bus.

308).

~liller

stated that Plaintiff's vehicle was in his lane fer
mat:o~:

apprc~

:.·..:c or three seconds before Plaintif:'.: appliec his
Duri:ig this short t•,.;o or ::i:-

brakes anc abruptly stopped.
second perioc defendant

~iller

was attempting to slow the

bus down to increase the space between the vehicles but
could not do so.

(R.

309-312).

~hen

the brake lights

o~

the Mustang went on :.ir. Miller floored the trakes ir. a
panic stop of the bus.

(R.

313) .

While Miller estimated that the distance the two car!
traveled during the period of time after the Mustang
entered his lane was 400 feet

(R.

308), Mr.

Rudolph Limpe::

Plaintiff's reconstruction expert, ad!'1itted t'.:-iat i:'.: t:-.e b~'
driver's estimate of time and speed were correct the two
vehicles would only have tra·;eled 88 feet toqethcr rather
than 400.

(R. 657).

The jurors were entitlec: to deter:nic

based upon the evidence presented by the various parties
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0

re accurate than his estimate as to traveled
di:Jtc.nce.
Assuming, there:cre, that the bus was traveling at
30
cct

~iles

an hour in the right lane and that the plaintiff

in :ront o: the bus at approximately the same speed

lea'1i;,g a 25 or 30 :oot space between them, and assuming
that the car only traveled for two or three seconds before
abruptly

bra~ing,

it was therefore proper for the jury

to be instructed that the actions of the plaintiff had
placed the defendant bus driver in a perilous
hi~

which excused
nor~ally

situation

f rorn the same standard of care that is

applicable in cases where sudden and unexpected

con:rcntations ha?e not occurred.
~he

Supre~e

168 P.2d 400
problem.

Court of Washingtin in Grapp v. Peterson,

(Wash. 1946) dealt with nearly an identical

In that case the plaintiff complained that a

sudden peril instruction had been given and was not justified.
The defendant,

just as here, claimed that the plaintiff had

darted in front of his vehicle and had abruptly stopped,
therefore causing the collision.

In finding that the

giving of the sudden peril instruction was not erroneous
the ~~shington Supreme Court stated the following:
Obviously there is a difference between
a situation where a respondent driver by his
own choice follows so closely behind another
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car upon the highway that he is unable to
stop in time to avoid a collision with the leading
car, and a situation where lhe leading car by
passing and cutting in front of the respondent,
places the respondent unwittin~l; in a following
car position.
Thus in the second situation,
when the leading car stops suddenl~', the
respondent is placed jn a position of sudden
peril through no fault of his own.
In the first situation the respondent
clearly has the responsibility of avoiding the
collision.
In the second situation, in accordance with the established ::'."'1le, the res2ondent
ought not to be held to the sa~e burden to avoid
a collision as one who has had ti~e for deliberate actions.
The court's instruction ~o. 7
properly applies to this latte:::- situation.
Id. at 403.
See also Jaeger v. Estep,

384 P.2d 174

(Ore. 1963).

In sununary, therefore, the instructions gi'1en by the
trial court and the one instruction refused to be given
by the trial court were proper ccnsidering the state of
the record at the conclusion of the trial.

Appellant

continually maintains that this is a case where a car
slowed down and stopped for a red light and under such
circumstances was not required to give any type of signal.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15).

Were the evidence con-

sistent with this view Plaintiff's position would be
correct.

However, Defendants' theory rested upon the

assumption that the automobile being driven by Plaintiff
cut in front of the bus, traveled ;,;i th the bus for only
two or three seconds, abruptly made a stop, and did so
some 50 feet from the preceding bus and some 150 feet
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trcm the red light.
The jJry was therefore entitled to determine under
the circQmstances argued by Defendants whether or not a
signal should have been given to the bus driver of this
stop, whether the bus driver had done anything negligent
in controlling the speed or distance between the vehicles
and, of ccurse, whether the brakes of the bus were functioning properly.

Because of these considerations the

jury was entitled to be instructed as to the various
legal rules applicable so that the jurors could determine
for themselves whether the circumstances justified the
application of these rules.

There was, therefore, no

error committed by the lower court in the jury instructions.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE
FAI:C,URE OF DEFEND?~'JT JOHN G. MILLER TO APPEAR
.".ND TESTIFY.
Plaintiff asserts that he was denied a fair trial
because of certain "misrepresentations" of defense counsel
concerning the appearance of John Miller at trial and
because of the prejudicial effect his failure to appear
had upon cross-examination.

Both of these contentions

are unfounded.
First, Plaintiff makes numerous claims in his brief
that he had been "misled" by the statements of defense
counsel concerning Mr. Miller's availability.
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brief, pp. 15-19).

These assei·ti,:ins -J.re cor,pletely

unsupported by the record and there is nc stipulation,
testimony, or order as to any of the claired representations made by Defendants' counsel.

It is fundamental

that contentions not preserved in the appellate record
cannot be considered on appeal.
Datacap, 545 P.2d 512

Skyline Leasing v.

(Utah 1976).

it is ....

Fur-:.!""1ermore,

plaintiff's obligation to protect his record as to any
supposed representations or stipc;la tions of ap::iosing coc;:.:
and the failure to do so is fatal to such a clai8.
Bell v. Herrington, 555 P.2d 687

(~J.~.

~!oun::

1976) .

.';eccnd, however, what :::iocumer1ts do e:c:.st in the recc:
pertain~ng

to

~iller's

appearance directly contradict

Plaintiff's assertion of misrepresentation.
1980, some four days prior to the trial,

Cn .:-..pril 26,

the plaintiff

himself filed a "Motion to Permit C.:se of Defencant
Deposition in Lieu of Defendar.t' s .:..p;:iearar.ce."

( R.

This motion stated the following:
The plaintiff by and through counsel and
pursuant to Rule 32 of the Ctah ?ules of
Civil Procedure, hereby moves the court for
an order granting the right to the plaintiff
to produce a person at trial to act as the
witness, John G. Miller.
This ~oticn is
based upon the following:

1. Counsel for the defendant assured
counsel for the plaintiff that he would
produce the defendant at trial.
2.
Counsel for the defendant properly
notified counsel for the plaintif:' b;· J.etter
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~lille:'

91-92

cf OctotFr 22, 1979, that he was having difficulty obta1~1ng the defendant's cooperation
that he had attempted to subpoena him for
'
trial, b 11t as of April 22, 1980, had not
been able to do so.
3.
Eased upon the letter of April 22,
1980, from defendant's counsel, counsel for
the plaintiff has caused a subpoena to be
issued and will attempt to serve such subcoena
before the trial date which commences on "
~--.~?r.:_1 3,
2-980.
4.
In the event that the subpoena of
either the defendant's counsel or the
plaintiff's counsel is not served or, in
the alternative, is not observed by the
defendant, the plaintiff needs to utilize
the testi~ony of the defendant at a deposition.
Such deposition has been filed with the court
by defendant's counsel.
Plaintiff further moves for the publishing
of the defendant's deposition for use at trial.
Dated this 26th day of April, 1980.
(signed)

David ~. Robinson
Attorney for Plaintiff

Thus, the record shows that Defendants' counsel
notified Plaintiff's counsel as early as October 22, 1979,
of the problem involved in obtaining Mr. Miller for trial.
A further letter of April 22, 1980, again alerted Plaintiff's counsel as to this problem.

It is therefore

difficult to believe that "counsel for defendant assured
counsel for plaintiff up to and including the first day
of trial that Mr. Miller would be available and that they
'.-JOuld have ~lr. :-Ii~_ler available at the trial."

(Appellant's

brief, p. 18).
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Likewise, Plaintiff's claim that on the first dav 0 ~
trial counsel for Defendants assured counsel for Plainti::
that "Hr. Miller was driving in fron Chicago .:rnd would !:;e
available at the trial to testify,"

(Appellant's brief,

p. 19) is also highly suspect in light of the opening
statement made by Defendants' counsel on the first day o'.'
trial.

Mr. Tim Hanson, de:ense c::·u;1sel,

stated the

following to the jury:
As you are already aware, I ~ill represent
the Transit Authority and I also represent their
driver, Mr. Miller.
Mr. ~iller is not currently
a~~loved.
He has been for some time with the
Tr~nslt Authority and the evidence will show
that he currently drives a long-distance true~.
Hopefully we will have him here but he will be
able to testify in addition to his deposition
that has been taken.
I don't know if you ~new what depositions
are, but that is a procedure where the attorneys
before a trial come to court here, take testimonv
under oath from parties or witnesses or ·,.,;hoe'.·er we want who knew something about the accident.
Fortunately in this case that has been done with
regard to Mr. Miller so you will have the benefit
of his testimony.
(Tr. 331).
Certainly, this statement does not seer:i to reflect Plaint::
assertion that defense

counsel had intended on Mr. :·!ille:

arrival the following day.
Third, it should be noted that the deposition of ~r.
Miller was introduced and read into the record by the
plaintiff--not the defendants.

This Court should note

that Plaintiff made no objection as tc any prejudice
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occurring from the reading of this deposition.
4 6 2) •

(Tr. 461-

It is therefore hard to conceive how Plaintiff

was ~rejudiced when he specifically requested the reading

cE the aeposition both prior to trial and during trial
and further failed to object to any alleged prejudice
~culd

which

occur by the absence of Mr.

~tiller.

Finally, the claimed prejudice of being unable to
cross-examine ~iller as to the accident report he previously
filed is also totall~· groundless.
da~ed

Report

The Transportation Loss

January 18, 1977, referred to by Plaintiff

in his brief (Appellant's brief,

~-

16), was actually

introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 31.

For

t'.:ns reason alone the jury had the benefit of the testimony
of

~iller

and could compare it with the alleged discrepancy

contained in the Transportation Loss
More

i~portantly,

cally referred to

~eport.

however, this report was specifi-

d~ring

the time of the deposition and

Mr. Miller referred to it throughout his deposition testimony.
Mr.

(R.

~1iller

291-320).

As an example, Mr. Wells in questioning

entered into the following dialogue:
~ow,

Q.

you have indicated in your loss report
that vou filed with the company, you stated
here that you bumped into the rear of a car
just as I was leaving a stop.

A.

Just after I had left the stop.

Q.

So, you're now telling us that your recollection today is different than it was at this
t~!"'.'.e?
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A.

Well, that's ·..;hat it s0ys,
leaving the stop, ~es.

Q.

Didn't you state that
or two back?

A.

It's not a block or two.
1950 to 2050,
about a block.
(?. 301).

t~2

just as I ·.-.r.'\s
sto~

was a

tlcc~

Mother example can te :ound in t'.:e te.sti:-:-io:--.::· ·.·.rhe:.:-e
~ -

Mr. Wells states, "Now, on ca0e 2
a section here called

conditio~

c~

specifically under the place where
stated,
.-";_

i.:-i

~·Jould

the day.'

face.

testi~ony

'~

:.:cu

In addition, an examination of
with Mr. Miller's

e~uip~ent.

~.a·::

t:-.e::·

'fc·_i

have

refers to defect:s

Bus had received a road

'brakes very spongy .

:::.ct:::-iie:-

t:l-':e report,

tell

\JS

E:~hibit

a.tout t:-iat.'

31P

as co::+::

shows no contradiction on its

The Transportation Loss ?.eport C.oes net descri::e •·

movement of the Mustang in any •.-.ra'/ as to ·,;here

l

t

car:-,e

from, how long it was in front of the :lri'ler, or ar:y

ot~.e:

actions it took except for tbe fact tr.at it: "stopped
abruptly."

The testimony o: :Olr. Miller,

therefore, ::iere:;

supplemented and explained in detail the ratr.e:c cursor::·
report filed with the UTA.
Plaintiff in his brief has erroneously used the wo~
"Defendant" rather than "Plaintif:" in his head1nc; of
Point II by stating:
The Defendant was Der:ied a Fair Trial bv t~e
Failure of Defendant John G. ~1ller to ~ppe.'lr
at Trial .
(."'.ppellant's brief, ?· 15).
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In

~ctuality,

this statement is correct since if any pre-

judice occurred bv the absence of Mr. Miller it was to
~he

defendants, not to Plaintiff.

Defendants were forced

to rely upon the deposition of Miller which had been taken
entirely by Plaintiff's attorney.
~ony

there

~as

Without Miller's testi-

no evidence as to a different version of

the accident than that told by the plaintiff.
For this reason, it is inconceivable that Defendants
would not wish c·!r. Miller present in the courtroom to
testify so that defense counsel could frame the questions
and present the evidence for the benefit of Defendants.
An"' hardship in Miller's failure to attend went directly
to Defendant CTA which was then forced to rely entirely
upon the defosition of

~r.

Miller taken only by the plain-

tiff's attorney.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the failure of
Miller to appear at trial in no way prejudiced the plaintiff
and

t~e clai~ed

error is totally without merit.
POINT III

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN F;>.ILING TO
ICJSTRuCT ?HE JuRY ON THE CONSEQCEHCES OF
TnEIR APPORTIOllMENT OF NEGLIGENCE.

Plaintiff argues in his brief that he was prejudiced
because the jury was not told that a finding of over 50%
negligence en the part of Plaintiff would preclude any

recovery.

Plaintiff admits that no formal objection was
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made and that no proposed instruction was submitted to
the trial court.

Since Plaintiff is required under Rule

51, u.R.C.P., to specifically object to the failure of
giving instructions and to file written requests of proposed instructions, the failure to do so waives any argun,
Plaintiff may now make.
In fact, the instant case is no different than that
case cited by Plaintiff, Lampkin v. Lynch,

600 P.2d 530

(Utah 1979), where the plaintiff there also failed to
properly object in the lower court and this Court stated,
"This point is raised for the first time on appeal and
hence was not ruled upon by the trial court.
we do not consider it on appeal."

Consequenfr·

Id. at 533.

It should also be noted, however,

that in those state:

referred to by Plaintiff which now allow a jury to be tol:
the consequences of its verdict, the large majority of
states have statutorily amended the comparative

neglige~e

laws to permit this action.
Even if this is a judicial matter, however, the
overruling of the McGinn decision should require

extensi~

argument and briefing by both parties in the lower court
and, of course, should comply with all procedural requirements as to preserving objections and error in the lower
court.
For these reasons, Defendants believe it unnecessa0
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to further comment upon this claimed error now raised
by Plaintiff for the first time in his brief.

POINT IV
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT A RESULT OF SYMPATHY,
BL\S, PASSION OR PREJUDICE A..'.JD IS FULLY
SUPPOR'I';wLZ I:.J LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
It is basic that

~hen

a jury verdict is supported by

competent evidence it is left unaltered by an appellate
court unless there is a showing of passion and prejudice.
heber Basin \-later Conservancy District v. Skeen, 328 P.2d
730

(Ctah 1958).

It has been stated that before damages

will be set aside on the basis of passion or prejudice
the conscience of the court must be shocked by the inadequacy
or the excessiveness of the award.
569 P.2c 1246

\:~yo.

Town of Jackson v. Shaw,

1977).

Appellant argues that the jury was "acting contrary
to the weight of the evidence in the case and had been
confused considering the apportionment of negligence,
the effect on damages and was clearly a result of sympathy,
bias, passion and prejudice."

(Appellant's brief, p. 26).

'I'his assertion is, once again, unfounded in the record.
As mentionec previously there was ample evidence for
the jury to conclude that the sudden and unexpected action
of the plaintiff in darting into the right lane of traffic
and suddenly stopping some 50 feet in back of a bus was
a negligent acLion and that the conduct of the plaintiff
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was the major contributing cause of the accident.
Even the authority cited by plaintiff,

Heff ~ Heff,

concludes that in certain situations the apportionment
of negligence between a stopped vehicle and the followins
vehicle will depend upon the

circw~stances

Quoting from that quotation cited
brief (Appellant's brief, p.

27)

b::

of the case.

?lainti:: in his

full! supr:orts :::lefenda'.'.~'

argument in the trial:
It was heretofore indicated that not all
rearend collisions are settled or liti;ated en
a percentage of 100%.
Obviously, in cases
~~ere the plaintiff stops without sicnal or
stoos in the countrv or at a olace where stoos
are not ordinarilv made, or stops abruptly,
this percentage must ce modified._ Ordinarilf,
brake lights at the stoppi~g car are sufficient
warning.
However, there are instances where
the driver of the stopping car is aware, or
should in the exercise of ordinarv care be
aware, of traffic conditions tc the rear
which make stopping at that point and time
negligence.
Heft & Heft, Comparative Clegligence Manual, Section 4.30 (1971) (Emphasis
added) .
Thus, as to liability, there is ample evidence

unde~

Defendants' theory of the accident to support a finding
of 70% negligence on the part of Plaintiff and 30% negligence on the part of Defendants.

The ar;uments ;:iade by

Plaintiff in his brief are properly addressed to the jucy
and not to this Court since whether the bus had "sufficie:·
time to stop without colliding with the plaintiff" is a
matter of judgment based l'.[lon the facts whic'.1 is clearl]'
within the province of the fact:"inder to deterLline.
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Likewise, the assessment of damages by the jury is
also within the realm of the evidence.

The jury found

special damases of $7,700 which included the claim of
medical expenses and lost wages.
bel~eved,

The jury could have

for example, the testimony of Dr. Andrew Rouff

who is the chief of orthopedics at the Salt Lake Veterans
?.C.ministration Hospital, and who examined the plaintiff
on behalf of the defendants.

This witness concluded that

he coLld find no objective evidence to support the subjective complaints made by the plaintiff.

(Tr. 502).

The jury could easily have believed that much of the
medical treatment received by the plaintiff was for the
purpose of making it appear that the plaintiff was seriously
injured.

Cn cross-examination Plaintiff's own doctcr

admitted that he could not understand

~hy

the plaintiff

continually visited him when the plaintiff was already
being treated by an orthopedic specialist.

(Tr. 475-476)

The jury could also have believed that since Plaintiff's
attorney suggested a specialist to consulting Dr. Wright
within several days after the accident that much of the
expense and claimed injuries were solely for the purpose
of obtaining a judgment against the defendants.

(Tr. 480)

Likewise, as to the loss of wages Plaintiff made a
claim of some $16,000 for his inability to work during the
period cf time he claimed he was unable to return to
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Kennecott.

The jury could have believed, however, that

Plaintiff could easily have worked at a jot less strenuous
although lower paying at Kennecott had he so desired or
could, as Dr. Horne, Plaintiff's physician admitted, have
worked doing plumbing privately or teaching pluwbing
classes.

(Tr. 594).

that there was ample

The record will show, therefore,
evi~encE

for the jury ':o conclude

that most of the lost wages we.:e \lnnecessa:-y and could
have been offset by Plaintiff had he chosen to work.
Similarly, the award of general damages of 55,000 is
not so inadequate to shock the conscience of the court.
If the jury concluded that Plaintiff's injuries

wer~

grossly exaggerated or agreed wi':h Dr. Rouff that even
giving credence to Plaintiff's subjective

co~plaints

Plaintiff only suffered two percent partial total disability (Tr. 501), then $5,000 is certainly not out of
line.
It was for the jury to detecr,ine the credibility of
the evidence based upon the testimony and de:r.eanor of the
witnesses.

For example, the plaint:!..ff ':estified in the

liability aspect of the case that he had been stopped rouc:
a minute at the intersection and that he locked in his
mirror and saw the bus coming when it was still half a
block away.

(Tr. 387-388).

This version of the accider.t

was completely contrar:/ to the testimon~, of t'-1e bus driver
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and

w~s

a

v~rsicn

of the accident which was hardly argued

at trial nor on this appeal.

Rather, Plaintiff's attorneys

seemed to concentrate upon the correctness of Defendants'
version of thC> accident but attempted to show that faulty
brakes prevented the bus from stopping quickly enough
after Plainti:f's car had darted in front of it.
The jury was certainly entitled to measure the cre8ibility of ?laintiff not only as to the liability aspects
of

t~e

case but also as to the damage claim--both special

and general.
o~

There is no evidence suggested by Plaintiff

any conduct during the trial which would give rise to

a claim of passion or prejudice and, in fact, it would
logically be assu.:ned that any prejudice wou2.d be against
the corporate entity of UTA or the driver who failed to
attend his own trial.
This same argument of prejudice was raised in the
lower cc:iurt by Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and the
lo·.ver ccurt, in its discretion, rejected such argument.
It

is axiomatic in this state that the granting or

refusing of motions for new trial is a discretionary
matter with the lower court.
Co.

·1.

Uptown Appliance and Radio

Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1955) ·

For the preceding reasons, therefore, Plaintiff's
contention that the jury verdict was influenced by passion
and prejudice and was contrary to the weight of the
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evidence is totally without merit and must b~ rejected.
POINT V
THE LOWER couRT' s REFUSAL TO GEi\NT Pu,Ic;TIFF'
MOTION TO .~MEND THE CO~lPL:Hi\T TO .-'1SSEET
WILLFUL AND WANTON NEGLIGENCE DID "OT DE~JY
PLAINTIFF A FAIR TRI~L.

s

Plaintiff claims that he was denied a fair trial

:s,

because Judge Croft on

Januar~

Plaintiff to amend his

complai~t

see~1ns

on several assertions:

all~

punitive dana;es

Plainti f: 's :-:.otion was

and to add additional defendants.
~ased

:?3C, refused =o

(R.

59-60)

first,

that be

bus driver admitted that the bus had faulty brakes when
it left the garage; second, that the de:endant conplaine:
to his supervisor that the brakes were

defecti~e

but the

supervisor said the brakes were all ri;ht and told the
driver to take the bus anywa:/; third,

that the "brakes

were bad at the time the said Cus 2-e:t the gara9e

11
;

:oi..:~t~.

that an investigator for Plainti.::'f had obtai;-ied nunerCJ•Js
statements from employees of UTA who stated that it was
the management policy of UTA to senc1 b:.;ses out onto the
road even with defective brakes;

.::'ifth, that it is the

policy of UTA to send buses out with defective brakes;
and sixth, that this conduct is a willful and wanton
disregard of the safety of others.
Plaintiff in his brief makes nu~erous assertions
as to what transpired at the January 13, 1980 hearing
and the reasons that the lower ccurt denied Plaintiff's
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moti'"'n ·,,i_':.J::out any record reference to such statement.
In fact,

such reference cannot be made because the record

is barren ~f any of the proceedings which occurred on
that date.

However,

the order signed by Judge Croft states the

folLY.vins:
Upon reviewing the basis for the request
for leave to amend and being advised by
counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff
could not in good faith allege malice in
SU?port of his claim for punitive damages
and the Court, being fully advised in the
premises and qood cause otherwise appearing,
it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff's motion
to amend his complaint tc add a count for
?Uniti7e damages and to add additional defendants
i_s denied.
(R. 69).
Since this is the only statement appearing in the
record as to the grounds for denial of Plaintiff's motion,
it must be assumed that this was in fact the reason the
lower court denied Plaintiff's motion.
an

~ssential

Because malice was

element of Plaintiff's claim it was therefore

required that the lower court deny Plaintiff's motion.
In addition, however, Rule 15 U.R.C.P. leaves the
lower court with complete discretion as to whether a party
should be allowed to amend a complaint.
Hill,

268 ?.2d 988

(Utah 1955).

Davis Stock Co. v.

Since this matter was set

for trial in less than two months from the time Plaintiff's
motion was ~ade it was entirely within the discretion of
the lower court to deny this new claim even if Plaintiff's
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statement in his brief is correct that the time element
was considered by the lower court.
Further, failure to amend the complaint had no effect
whatsoever upon the outcome of this trial.

Had Plaintiff

been able to bring in 100 people who stated that CTA
customarily released buses which had defecti•;e brakes, suer.
evidence would be imrnaterial to this case unless it could
also be shown that the bus involved in

~he

accident had

defective brakes.
While Mr. Miller did not believe the brakes were
operating properly he never stated in his deposition that
they were "defective."

The signout mechanic wr.o

gave the bus to for a test run disagreed with
stated they were satisfactory.

~lr.

~iller

:-1iLc:

and

More importantly, however,

the findings by the UTA mechanics following the accident
showed only that the slack adjusters were somewhat out of
adjustment.
Plaintiff's own expert, Rudolph Limpert, admitted tha:
based upon these findings the fact that one wheel was not
properly adjusted would have had no effect upon the brak1r.:
ability of the bus assuming the other brakes were pror::er.
Since Plaintiff produced no evidence to show defective
brakes on the remaining three wheels, Plaintiff cornpletely
failed in his burden to show defective brakes.
This failure is especially apparent in light of the
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foreman and engineer who both stated
tr.e rr,c~hanic the following day did not
jetract fro~ the efficiency of the braking system and
that tests had Leen run showing that the bus would have
been in ccnpl~te ca~pliance with state standards even
assu."'.li!v; the ·.nrst pcssible case speculated by the
9lai;;.ti=':':.
Thus,

had t~e jury awarded punitive damages such award
~~

tc be overturned as a

there would have
~asic

~e 0 n

u-

of law since

nc evidence to even support the
showing~

reguirencnt cf a

tive re9ardless

~atter

·•

~he

brakes were defec-

any supposed policy that UTA may have

had.
For these
Plaintif:':' s

==~sens,

:cot.i~>n.

tG

the trial court properly denied

an.end the complaint and it cannot

be said under any stretch of the facts existing in this
case that ?lainti:':f was in any way prejudiced by such
der11al.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff continually throughout his brief presents

cnl1 those facts wh~ch he wishes to utilize in su~port of
his theory of the accident.

Plaintiff ignored the evidence

and testimony which the jury could have believed supporting
Naturally, as long as there is subsupport t~e jury verdict this Court
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will not disturb it.
The instructions given by the lower court were
correct in that they explained rules of law applicable to
this case and were based upon factual evidence in the
record.

Whether or not Plaintiff caused this accident

by his change of lanes and abrupt stop was solely a question for the jury and the jury was, therefore, entitled to
know the legal standards applicable.
The absence of the defendant Miller to attenc the
trial was prejudicial only to the defendant UTri since it
was necessary for it to rely entirely upon a deposition
taken by Plaintiff's own attorney.

There is nothing in

the record to show that defendant UTA or defense counsel
deliberately misrepresented or mislead Plaintiff's attorne7!
as to the appearance of Mr. Miller.

Finally, the supposec

prejudice occurring because of the inability to crossexamine Mr. Miller is totally lacking in merit since
Plaintiff interrogated him concerning the transportation
report during his deposition, the report was actually
introduced into evidence, and the report did not contradic:
Miller's depositional testimony.
The claim of Plaintiff as to instructing the jury
concerning the effect of their verdict was waived by
Plaintiff's failure to submit a jury instruction to the
lower court or to object to the failure of sue~ instructie"

-40-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

being given.
There is no evidence of bias or prejudice existing
in this verdict.

As has been stated, there is substantial

evidence to support both the liability aspect and the
damage aspect of the jury verdict.

As such, the verdict

should be upheld.
Finally, the failure of the lower court to amend
Plaintiff's complaint for punitive damages is also groundless since the evidence at trial does not support Plaintiff's
contention of defective brakes even viewing it most favorably
to him.

And, furthermore, Plaintiff would have been unable

to show malice on the part of defendant UTA even had such
brake failure been estatlished.
For these reasons, therefore, the verdict of the
lower court should be sustained and the judgment of the
lower court affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

/}.

~/v !~

~~ot

,

~ '
' v1'~
'
. Han'!S:(
Attorney for Respondents
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